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Abstract
Th e current relationship between the two European courts has been discussed in some great 
detail while the future of that relationship has been widely neglected. Th is is somewhat surpris-
ing as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and with it of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as well as the EU’s succession to the ECHR are probably going to take place before too 
long. Th e article fi rst examines Article 52(3) of the Charter, which prescribes that the ECHR be 
the minimum standard of human rights in the EU. It is argued that Article 52 (3) does not entail 
a reference to the ECtHR’s case law so that the ECJ will not be bound by that case law. After an 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, it is likely that both courts will assert that they have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the ECHR in inter-state cases, which creates a jurisdictional confl ict for which 
a solution must be found. In addition, the article explores whether after an accession, the Bospho-
rus case law will have a future and whether the dictum found in Opinion 1/91 will be applicable, 
according to which the ECJ is bound by the decisions of courts created by an international agree-
ment to which the EC is a party.
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I. Introduction
In recent years, the legal relationship between diff erent international courts 
has attracted more and more scholarly attention. Th e so-called prolifera-
tion of international courts and tribunals has led to a debate about poten-
tial jurisdictional overlaps or even confl icts between these courts.1 Th e 
1) On this discussion see for instance: Tullio Treves, “Confl icts Between the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice”, 31 New York University Journal 
of International Law & Politics (1999) 809; Hugh Th irlway, “Th e Proliferation of International 
Judicial Organs and the Formation of International Law” in W.P. Heere (ed.), International Law
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present article will focus on the future relationship between two of the 
busiest international courts in the world: the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). In a preliminary step, the well-known present relationship between 
these two courts will be briefl y examined. On that basis their future rela-
tionship will be explored. Th e two courts’ relationship is likely to change 
in two scenarios: fi rst, once the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
entered into force and second, after an accession of the European Com-
munities to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
II. Present Situation
Presently, the European Community is not a party to the ECHR and 
therefore not directly bound by it.2 According to the well-established case 
law of the ECJ, which is refl ected in Article 6 (2) EU, the ECHR consti-
tutes the minimum standard for human rights in the EU because all EU 
Member States are also bound by the ECHR.3 However, this does not 
imply that the EC itself is bound by the ECHR. As long as the EC itself is 
not a member to the Convention, the Convention rights have only got an 
indirect infl uence on the scope of fundamental rights in the European 
and Th e Hague’s 750th Anniversary (Springer, Th e Hague 1999), 433; Shane Spelliscy, “Th e 
Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor”, 40 Columbia Journal of Trans-
national Law (2001) 143; Gilbert Guillaume, “Th e proliferation of international judicial bodies: 
Th e outlook for the international legal order”, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations of 27 October 2000 <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?
pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1>, 23 April 2009; Jean-Marie Dupuy, “Th e Danger of Frag-
mentation or Unifi cation of the International Legal System and the International Court of Jus-
tice”, 31 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics (1999) 791; Yuval Shany, Th e 
Competing Jurisdictions Between International Courts and Tribunals (OUP, Oxford 2004), pp. 1–11.
2) Th e EC is presently not competent to accede to the ECHR: Opinion 2/94 Accession to the 
ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; analyses of that opinion can be found in: Panos Koutrakos, EU 
International Relations Law (Hart, Oxford 2006), pp. 128–132; Piet Eeckhout, External Rela-
tions of the European Community (OUP, Oxford 2004), pp. 82–87; Anthony Arnull, “Left To Its 
Own Devices? Opinion 2/94 and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union” 
in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), Th e General Law of E.C. External Relations (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2000), p. 774; Matthias Ruff ert, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [1996] 
197. In addition, the ECHR is presently only open to states.
3) Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, EU Law (4th edn., OUP, Oxford, 2007), pp. 385–386; 
Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (3rd edn., C.H. Beck, München 
2008), 27.
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Community so that the Community itself cannot be held responsible for 
possible infringements of these rights.4 Th e Member States, however, are 
bound by both: Community law and the ECHR. Th is means that when 
implementing Community law, the Member States must generally comply 
with the ECHR.
On various occasions both the European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECommHR)5 and the ECtHR had to decide cases directed against Mem-
ber States of the EC, concerning actions by Member States that had been 
determined by Community law.6 Th e two most important decisions for 
the present relationship between Community law and the ECHR are the 
cases of Matthews and Bosphorus. According to the ECtHR’s decision in 
Matthews, Member States are responsible if EC primary law (in that case 
the EC Act on Direct Elections of 1976) violates the Convention.7 Th e 
main reasons for this are that although the Member States are not excluded 
from transferring competences on an international organization, they remain 
responsible for infringements of the ECHR after such a transfer.8 Moreover, 
the respondent United Kingdom had freely agreed to be bound by the act 
in question and EC primary law cannot be challenged before the ECJ.9
In the more recent Bosphorus decision, the ECtHR was faced with the 
question of whether an EU Member State, in this case Ireland, could be 
held responsible under the Convention for the mere execution of an EC 
Regulation.10 Th e ECtHR had to reconcile two basic principles: On the 
 4) CFTD v European Communities, (App no 8030/77) (1978) D.R. 13, 213; Dufay v European 
Communities, (App no 13539/88) (ECommHR 19 Jan 1989).
 5) Th e ECommHR was abolished by the 11th protocol to the ECHR, which entered into force 
on 1 Nov 1998. 
 6) M & Co. v Germany (App no 13258/87) (1990) D.R. 64, 146; Procola v Luxembourg (App no 
14570/89) (1993) D.R. 75, 5; Cantoni v France (App no 17862/91) (1996) ECHR 1996-V; 
Senator Lines v 15 Member States of the EC (App no 56672/00) (2004) ECHR 2004-IV; Emesa 
Sugar v Netherlands (App no 62023/00) (ECHR 13 Jan 2005).
 7) Matthews v United Kingdom (App no 24833/94) (1999) ECHR 1999-I. Cf. case-notes by: 
Iris Canor, “Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in Europe?”, 
25 European Law Review (2000), 3; Toby King, “Ensuring human rights review of intergovern-
mental acts in Europe”, 25 European Law Review (2000), 79; Sebastian Winkler, “Der Euro-
päische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, das Europäische Parlament und der Schutz der 
Kon ventionsgrundrechte im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”, Europäische Grundrechte Zeit-
schrift [2001] 18.
 8) Matthews (n 7) para. 32.
 9) Matthews (n 7) para. 33.
10) Bosphorus v Ireland (App no 45036/98) 2005 ECHR 2005-VI; confi rmed by Coopérative des 
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one hand, parties to the Convention are not prevented from transferring 
powers to an international organization. On the other hand, a party can-
not fully escape its responsibilities under the Convention by such a trans-
fer. According to the ECtHR, a Member State remains responsible under 
Article 1 ECHR for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of 
whether they are rooted in domestic law only or are a consequence of the 
State’s membership in the EC.11 An action taken in compliance with obli-
gations arising from the membership in an international organization, 
however, can be justifi ed as long as that organization protects human rights 
at least in a manner equivalent to that of the Convention, if the Member 
State has no discretion in implementing these obligations.12 Equivalent, 
according to the ECtHR, means comparable and not identical. If such 
equivalent protection is found to exist, there will be a presumption that a 
State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it 
does no more than implement the obligations fl owing from its member-
ship in the organization.13 Th e presumption, however, is rebutted when the 
protection off ered was ‘manifestly defi cient’, which would have to be exam-
ined on a case by case basis. Th e ECtHR went on to conclude that the 
European Community did in fact aff ord such a level of protection and that 
the presumption in that case was not rebutted.14 Th erefore, the complaint 
agriculteurs de mayenne v France (App no 16931/04) (2006); cf. case notes on Bosphorus by: 
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis”, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) 243; Alicia Hinarejos 
Parga, “Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe”, 31 European 
Law Review (2006), 250; Cathryn Costello, “Th e Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, 6 Human Rights Law 
Review (2006) 87; Jean Paul Jacqué, 41 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005) 749; Sebas-
tian Winkler, “Die Vermutung des ‘äquivalenten Grundrechtsschutzes’ im Gemeinschaftsrecht 
nach dem Bosphorus-Urteil des EGMR”, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [2007] 641; Jürgen 
Bröhmer, “Die Bosphorus-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte – 
Der Schutz der Grund – und Menschenrechte in der EU und das Verhältnis zur EMRK”, 
Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaftsrecht (2006) 71; Stefan Lorenzmeier, “Das Verhältnis von 
europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention”, Jura [2007] 
370; Gerrit Schohe, “Das Urteil Bosphorus: zum Unbehagen gegenüber dem Grundrechtsschutz 
durch die Gemeinschaft”, Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaftsrecht [2006] p. 33; Nikolaos Lavra-
nos, “Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH”, Europarecht [2006)]79.
11) Bosphorus (n 10) paras. 152–153.
12) Bosphorus (n 10) para. 155.
13) Bosphorus (n 10) para. 156.
14) Bosphorus (n 10) paras. 159–166. Th e Bosphorus decision is reminiscent of the ECommHR’s 
decision in M & Co. v Germany (App no 13258/87) (1990) D.R. 64, 146 where the ECommHR 
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was held to be unfounded. Th e ECtHR also made it clear that the pre-
sumption in Bosphorus only operates where the Community law at issue 
could be challenged before the ECJ. Th erefore it does not apply where, as 
was the case in Matthews, the compliance of primary law with the ECHR 
is at issue.
Th e Bosphorus decision further clarifi es that the presumption only applies 
where the Member State had no discretion in implementing Community 
law.15 Where the Member State had some degree of discretion, its respon-
sibility will be the same as if a purely domestic act had been at issue.16 One 
of the questions left open by the ECtHR is whether the presumption also 
applies in cases where there has been no national act executing Commu-
nity law. Such a case could for instance arise where an applicant directly 
challenges a decision rendered by the Commission and confi rmed by the 
ECJ before the ECtHR. Bosphorus is based on the presumption that the 
protection of human rights in Community law is equivalent to that under 
the Convention. Th erefore, the ECtHR presumes that in cases where the 
Community’s Member States had no discretion when implementing sec-
ondary Community legislation that the Member States complied with the 
requirements of the Convention. Th erefore, Bosphorus privileges secondary 
Community law as such. Th us the presumption formulated by the ECtHR 
in Bosphorus must also be applicable in cases where there was no imple-
menting action by Member States.17
held that such complaints were inadmissible. A similar line of reasoning, albeit diff erent in detail, 
can be found in the Solange II-decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court; cf. Alicia 
Hinarejos Parga, “Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe”, 31 
European Law Review (2006), 250, 257–258; Cathryn Costello, “Th e Bosphorus Ruling of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, 
6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 87, 104–105; Jean-Paul Jacqué, 41 Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen (2005), 749, 763; Stefan Lorenzmeier, “Das Verhältnis von europäischem 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention”, Jura [2007] 370, 373; Ger-
rit Schohe, “Das Urteil Bosphorus: zum Unbehagen gegenüber dem Grundrechtsschutz durch 
die Gemeinschaft”, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [2006], 33; Nikolaos Lavranos, 
“Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH”, Europarecht [2006], 79, 86.
15) Th e ECtHR therefore did not deviate from its previous Cantoni decision, Cantoni v France 
(App no 17862/91) ECHR 1996-V, where it held France responsible for the implementation of 
an EC directive. 
16) Jean-Paul Jacqué, 41 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005), 749, 766; Alicia Hinarejos 
Parga, “Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe”, 31 European 
Law Review (2006) 250, 257.
17) Th is view is shared by: Nikolaus Marsch and Anna-Catharina Sanders, “Gibt es ein Recht der 
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While the general tenor of the ECtHR’s case law is that Member States 
cannot escape their obligations under the Convention, the Bosphorus deci-
sion must be regarded as proof of the continued silent cooperation and 
mutual respect between the ECtHR and the ECJ. Th e ECJ regularly refers 
to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law when adjudicating on fundamen-
tal rights in Community law, for which one of the main sources of inspira-
tion is the ECHR.18 Th erefore, the ECJ’s interpretation of the fundamental 
rights in Community law will usually be parallel to that of a similar Con-
vention right by the ECtHR.19 Arguably, the quality of the ECJ’s case law 
regarding fundamental rights has profi ted to a great extent from this paral-
lelism in interpretation.20 Th e ECtHR, too, increasingly refers to the ECJ’s 
case law, which helps to create a uniform human rights standard in Europe.21 
Parteien auf Stellungnahme zu den Schlussanträgen des Generalanwalts? Zur Vereinbarkeit des 
Verfahrens vor dem EuGH mit Art. 6 EMRK”, Europarecht [2008] 345, 361–362; Sebastian 
Winkler, “Die Vermutung des ‘äquivalenten’ Grundrechtsschutzes um Gemeinschaftsrecht nach 
dem Bosphorus-Urteil des EGMR”, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [2007] 641, 643; a more 
cautious approach is adopted by: C. Eckes, “Does the European Court of Human Rights Provide 
Protection from the European Community? – Th e Case of Bosphorus Airways”, 13 European 
Public Law (2007) 47, 54.
18) Th e fi rst reference to the ECHR is contained in: Case 4/73 Nold KG v Commission [1974] 
ECR 491, para. 12; the fi rst reference to the ECtHR’s case law can be found in: Case C-13/94 P 
v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, para. 16; on (alleged) inconsistencies in 
the case law of the two courts cf. Dean Spielmann, “Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg Courts: Confl icts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities” in P. Alston (ed.), 
Th e EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999) p. 757; Nina Philippi, “Divergenzen im Grun-
drechtsschutz zwischen EuGH und EGMR”, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien [2000] 97. 
For the reasons why the ECJ relies on the ECtHR’s case law cf. Guy Harpaz, “Th e European 
Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: Th e quest for 
enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy”, 46 Common Market Law Review [2009], 105, 
109 seq. In addition, Harpaz argues for a “very strong albeit rebuttable presumption of deferral 
to the case law” of the ECtHR, ibid. at p. 115.
19) E.g. Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger 
v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659; Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2002] ECR I-6279; cf. Anne Peters, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (C.H. Beck, 
München 2003) pp. 28–29; Hans Christian Krüger; Jörg Polakiewicz, “Proposals for a Coherent 
Human Rights Protection System in Europe”, 22 Human Rights Law Journal (2001) 1, 6. 
20) Cathryn Costello, “Th e Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Funda-
mental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 87, 129.
21) E.g., in Pellegrin v France (App no 28541/95) ECHR 1999-VIII 207, para. 66 and Goodwin 
v United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) ECHR 2002-VI. Th e ECtHR also helped to enforce 
Community law, e.g. Hornsby v Greece (App no 18357/91) ECHR 1997-II; S. A. Dangeville v 
France (App no 36677/97) ECHR 2002-III; cf. Dean Spielmann “La constitution économique 
de l’union européenne et les droits de l’homme” in O. Debarge et al. (eds.), La constitution 
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Th is cooperation, however, is not based on a legal duty to cooperate, but 
merely on comity. Th at means that either court can unilaterally end this 
cooperation at any moment.22 Th is is one of the reasons why an accession 
of the European Community to the ECHR should be welcomed as an 
accession would provide for a clear legal basis for the relationship between 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
III. Th e Future Part I: Entry into Force of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights
But before an accession of the EU to the ECHR will take place, it is likely 
that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will enter into force. Th e Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Commission solemnly proclaimed 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at the Nice summit on 7 Decem-
ber 2000.23 As a consequence, the Charter is presently not binding. How-
ever, both the ECJ and the CFI increasingly refer to its provisions as a 
confi rmation for their fi ndings regarding the Community’s fundamental 
rights.24 Th e reformed Article 6(1) TEU (Treaty of Lisbon) provides that 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights will have the same value as the Treaties. 
Th is means that the Charter will enter into force at the same time as the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Similarly, the failed European Constitution contained 
the Charter as its Part II. Even if the Treaty of Lisbon shares the fate of the 
Constitution, it is very likely that a new reform treaty will again provide 
for the Charter eventually entering into force. Th us it seems justifi ed to 
explore the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR after the 
économique de l’union européenne’ (Bruylant, Bruxelles 2008) pp. 297, 311–316; Dean Spiel-
mann, “La prise en compte et la promotion du droit communautaire par la Cour de Strasbourg”, 
in Les droits de l’homme en evolution: Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Petros J. Pararas (Bruylant, 
Brussels, 2009) pp. 455–472.
22) Nico Krisch, “Th e Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law”, 71 Modern Law 
Review (2008) 183, 201. 
23) 2000 OJ, C364/1; the amended version of the Charter to become binding according to the 
Lisbon Treaty can be found at: 2007 OJ, C303/1.
24) For instance: Case C-540/03 Parliament/Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para. 38; Case C-
305/05 Advocaaten van de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633, para. 46; 
Case C-432/05 Unibet v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271, para. 37; Case C-438/05 Interna-
tional Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP OÜ Viking 
Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 44; Case T-242/02 Sunrider v OHIM [2005] ECR II-
2793, para. 51. 
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Charter has become binding, and its infl uence on the relationship between 
the two European courts.
A. Th e ECHR as a Minimum Standard
Article 52(3) of the Charter defi nes the relationship between the rights 
contained in the Charter and the ECHR:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by the said Convention. Th is provision 
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.
Th is article aims to prevent that the human rights standard set by the 
Charter becomes lower than that of the ECHR. Article 52 of the Charter 
deals with the scope of the rights guaranteed. Th erefore, a restriction of a 
fundamental right that is also guaranteed by the ECHR can only be justi-
fi ed if that restriction would also be permissible under the ECHR. Th ere-
fore, Article 52(3) provides for the ECHR as a minimum standard of 
human rights in the EU. Article 52(3) thus leads the EU to be indirectly 
bound by the ECHR as it must always be obeyed when restricting funda-
mental rights in the EU. Th e aim of Article 52(3) is to prevent Member 
States from being subjected to two diff erent standards of human rights 
protection when implementing EU law. Th erefore, Article 52(3) not only 
protects the status quo of the ECHR, but must also be read as a dynamic 
reference to the ECHR and its additional protocols. Should the ECHR 
be substantively amended in the future, these amendments will automati-
cally become the new minimum standard of human rights protection in 
the EU.25
25) Kolja Naumann, “Art. 52 Abs. 3 GrCh zwischen Kohärenz des europäischen Grundrechts-
schutzes und Autonomie des Unionsrechts“, Europarecht [2008] 424, 426; Julia Molthagen 
Das Verhältnis der EU-Grundrechte zur EMRK, PhD thesis Hamburg, 2003, <http://www.
sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/volltexte/2003/967/>, 23 April 2009, at p. 89; Marc Fischbach, 
“Grund rech te-Charta und Menschenrechtskonvention” in W. Heusel (ed.), Grundrechtecharta 
und Ver- fassung sentwicklung in der EU (Bundesanzeiger-Verlag, Köln, 2002), 125, 126.
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A list of corresponding rights can be found in the offi  cial explanations 
relating to the Charter.26 According to Article 52(7) of the Charter, these 
explanations “shall be given due regard by the Courts of the Union and 
the Member States” when interpreting the Charter. Considering that Arti-
cle 52(7) does not provide for the explanations to be binding but merely 
postulates a duty to duly regard them, it cannot be excluded that future 
case law will add other rights to that list.
B. Does Article 52(3) Make ECtHR Case Law Binding?
Having established that Article 52(3) of the Charter makes the ECHR the 
minimum standard when interpreting provisions of the Charter that cor-
respond to those of the ECHR, the question arises whether the interpreter 
of such provisions is also bound by the ECtHR’s case law regarding those 
rights. Th e fact that only the ECtHR’s (dynamic) interpretation shaped 
the rights contained in the ECHR and made the ECHR probably the most 
successful international human rights instrument, might suggest that that 
should be the case. Lenaerts and de Smijter contend that because the 
ECHR establishes the ECtHR and because the ECtHR interprets the 
rights laid down in the ECHR ex tunc it had to be assumed that the case 
law of the ECtHR formed an integral part of the meaning and scope of 
those rights.27 Considering that the ECJ will become the main interpreter 
of the Charter, such a result would lead to the ECJ being bound by the 
decisions of the ECtHR when interpreting the Charter. Regarding those 
rights, this would lead to a hierarchy of the two Courts with the ECtHR 
being at the top of that hierarchy.
26) Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007, C 302/33–34; that 
list, however, is not exhaustive: Yvonne Dorf, “Zur Interpretation der Grundrechtecharta”, Juris-
tenzeitung [2005], 126, 129; Molthagen (n 25); Nina Philippi, Die Charta der Grundrechte 
der Europäischen Union (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002), 44–45; Th omas von Danwitz, “Art 52 
Grundrechtecharta“ in P. J. Tettinger and K. Stern (eds.), Kölner Gemeinschaftskommentar zur 
Europäischen Grundrechte-Charta (C.H. Beck, München 2006) para. 55.
27) Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter, “Th e Charter and the Role of the European Courts”, 
8 Maastricht Journal of European Law (2001) 90, 99; a similar argument is put forward by Chris-
tian Busse, “Das Projekt der europäischen Grundrechtscharta vor dem Hintergrund der EMRK“, 
Th üringisches Verwaltungsblatt [2001], 73, 79; similar but without giving reasons: Lord Gold-
smith, “Th e Charter of Rights – a brake not an accelerator”, European Human Rights Law Review 
[2004], 473, 476; Nikolaos Lavranos, “Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und 
EuGH”, Europarecht [2006] 79, 80.
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When we look at the wording of Article 52(3), however, we cannot fi nd 
any express reference to the ECtHR’s case law. Only the ECHR itself is 
mentioned. Th e question is therefore, whether Article 52(3) can nonethe-
less be interpreted as containing such a reference. On the one hand, it is 
unlikely that the drafters of Article 52(3) wanted a mere reference to the 
50 year old text of the ECHR, especially considering that the ECHR has 
for a long time been dynamically interpreted as a “living instrument” by 
the ECtHR and thus been rendered a great deal more precisely.28 On the 
other hand, if one were to accept that the case law of the ECtHR will bind 
the interpreters of the Charter, this would mean that every further step in 
the development of human rights protection by the ECtHR would auto-
matically become part of EU law.29
Th e offi  cial explanations regarding Article 52 (3) explicitly mention the 
case law. Th ey state that “[t]he meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights 
are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union”.30 Th is certainly means that the case law of the 
ECtHR will be of great relevance when interpreting the corresponding 
rights in the EU-Charter. Th e preamble to the EU-Charter is phrased in a 
similar manner in that it also refers to the case law of the ECtHR and the 
ECJ. However, Article 52(7) only postulates a duty to duly regard these 
explanations and thus merely a duty to duly regard the ECtHR’s case law. 
Th is does not imply that the interpreter of the EU-Charter must strictly 
follow that case law. Th erefore, these explanations alone cannot provide a 
suffi  cient basis for the assumption that the ECJ would be bound by the 
ECtHR’s case law.
However, a duty to follow the case law could follow from the object and 
purpose of Article 52(3), which aims at a parallel interpretation of both the 
28) Naumann (n 25) p. 425; Johan Callewaert, “Die EMRK und die EU-Grundrechtecharta”, 
Europäische Grundrechtezeitung [2003], 198, 199; Johan Callewaert, “Les rapports entre la 
Charte et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme” in W. Heusel (ed.), Grundrechtecharta 
und Verfassungsentwicklung in der EU (Bundesanzeiger-Verlag, Köln, 2002) pp. 129, 132; Martin 
Borowsky, “Art. 52” in J. Meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (2nd edn., 
Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden. 2006) para. 37; Philippi (n 26), 45; Dorf (n 26), 128.
29) Borowsky (n 28) para. 37; Gerhard Ress, “Die Europäische Grundrechtscharta und das Ver-
hältnis zwischen EGMR, EuGH und den nationalen Verfassungsgerichten” in A. Duschanek and 
S. Griller (eds.), Grundrechte für Europa (Springer, Vienna, 2002), 183, 206.
30) OJ 2007, C 302/33 [emphasis added].
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ECHR and the EU-Charter in order to avoid that the ECtHR might 
regard an act of EU law, which had previously been sanctioned by the ECJ, 
to infringe the ECHR. After all, the most eff ective way of avoiding such a 
situation would be a strict duty to follow the ECtHR’s case law.
Yet such an explicit duty is nowhere to be found in the EU-Charter. 
Moreover, there had been various attempts to include an explicit reference 
to the ECtHR’s case law during the Convention, which was responsible for 
drafting the Charter.31 Yet the Convention found it impossible to agree 
upon such a reference.32 Th us, both the wording and the drafting history 
of the Charter do not support a strict bindingness of the ECtHR’s case law 
on the ECJ when interpreting the EU-Charter.
Th ere is also a further, more general argument against the assumption 
that the ECtHR’s case law should be binding on the ECJ: such a duty 
would be alien to European Union law. Court decisions under EU law are 
only binding inter partes. A duty to generally follow the case law of the 
ECtHR would implicate a great change in EU law, as it would basically 
introduce a doctrine of stare decisis as is typical for the common law. Were 
the ECJ to follow the case law of the ECtHR, the doctrine would go even 
further than normal as it would mean that a court of one legal order (the 
ECJ) would be bound by the decisions of a court of another legal order 
(the ECtHR). In addition, a doctrine of stare decisis only makes sense where 
there is a clear hierarchy of courts, including the possibility to fi le an appeal 
against decisions by the inferior court(s). An appeal gives the higher court 
an opportunity to review its own case law and adjust it. Th erefore, it would 
be necessary to introduce a procedural means that would either enable a 
party to appeal to the ECtHR or that would allow the ECJ to make a pre-
liminary reference to the ECtHR, in order to get guidance on the interpre-
tation of the ECHR. Th at, however, is not the case. Moreover, the present 
right to fi le an individual complaint under Article 34 ECHR cannot be 
31) CHARTE 4372/00 (CONVENT 39) containing proposals by the following members of the 
Convention: J. Meyer (p. 282); J.-P. Bonde (p. 487); J. Voggenhuber and K. Buitenweg (p. 560); 
D. Tarschys (p. 562); in addition, one of the observers of the Council of Europe argued in favour 
of such a reference: Marc Fischbach, “Le Conseil de l’Europe et la Charte des droits fondamen-
taux de l’union européenne”, Revue Universelle des Droits de l’Homme [2000] 7, 8.
32) Regarding the discussions in the Convention: Jonas Bering Liisberg, “Does the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights Th reaten the Supremacy of Community Law?”, 38 Common Market Law 
Review (2001), 1171, 1172; Molthagen (n 25); Margit Bühler, Einschränkung von Grundrechten 
nach der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta (Duncker & Humblodt, Berlin, 2005) pp. 320–321.
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regarded as a suffi  cient alternative to a formal appeal to the ECtHR for two 
reasons: Firstly, as long as the EU is not a party to the ECHR, such an 
individual complaint could only be directed against a Member State. Sec-
ondly, according to the Bosphorus presumption such a complaint would 
almost always be unsuccessful. It would not constitute a viable tool for an 
exchange between the two courts.
Th e foregoing arguments show that making the ECtHR’s decisions 
binding on the ECJ would mean a paradigm shift in EU law. Had such a 
shift been wanted, an express provision would surely have been included in 
the EU Charter. Moreover, the ECtHR itself is not bound by its own deci-
sions, nor does the ECHR provide that the national courts of the parties to 
the Convention be bound by its rulings. Article 46 ECHR only stipulates 
for a decision being binding inter partes.
Considering in addition that both the preamble and the explanations to 
Article 52(3) of the EU Charter mention the ECJ alongside the ECtHR 
suggests that neither Court is to be regarded superior to the other, but 
rather that both courts are regarded to co-exist as equals.33 For if one argues 
on that basis, that an interpreter of corresponding rights of the Charter 
and the ECHR should be bound by the case law of the ECtHR, one must 
also argue that such an interpreter is bound by the case law of the ECJ. 
Considering that the ECJ will be the fi nal interpreter of the EU Charter, 
this would result in the ECJ being bound not only by the case law of the 
ECtHR, but also by its own case law. In a scenario where the case law of 
both courts is contradictory, the ECJ would thus be bound by both its own 
case law and that of the ECtHR. For the ECJ this would result in a confl ict 
between the duty to follow the ECtHR’s case law on the one hand, and the 
duty to follow its own case law on the other. Th is shows that in such a case 
the purpose of Article 52(3), which is to create coherence and consistency 
in European human rights law, would not be better served if there was no 
legal duty to follow either case law.
Moreover, the mentioning of the ECtHR’s case law in the preamble of 
the EU Charter occurs in the context of the sources of the Charter rights 
and not in the context of the relationship between the EU Charter and the 
33) Stefan Lorenzmeier, “Das Verhältnis von Europäischem Gerichtshof und Europäischem 
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte – Konfl ikt oder Kooperation?” in J. Bast et al. (eds.), Die 
Europäische Verfassung – Verfassungen in Europa (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2005), 209, 223.
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ECHR.34 Th e preamble therefore suggests that the ECtHR’s case law is 
merely one of several aids to interpreting the EU Charter. Th erefore, it fol-
lows neither from Article 52(7) nor from the preamble that the case law of 
the ECtHR is binding. Th e explanations to Article 52 themselves confi rm 
this result in that they stress that the autonomy of EU law and the ECJ 
must not be aff ected by Article 52(3).35
In conclusion, one cannot assume that once the EU Charter has entered 
into force, the ECJ will be bound by the case law of the ECtHR when 
interpreting rights that correspond to those of the ECHR.
IV. Th e Future Part II: Accession to the ECHR
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the entry into force of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights will not be the fi nal step in the development of human 
rights in the EU. Article 6(2) of the new TEU provides that ‘the Union 
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.36 Th e inclusion of that provision was 
necessary as the ECJ decided in Opinion 2/94, that the European Com-
munity could not accede to the ECHR for lack of competence.37 Regard-
ing the Convention, a new Article 59(2), introduced by Protocol 14 to the 
ECHR, will provide for a possibility of accession for the EU.38 Once the 
EU has become a party to the ECHR, further questions regarding the rela-
tionship between the two European courts will arise: First, the question of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret agreements concluded by 
the EU; second, the question of the future of the Bosphorus presumption; 
and third, whether according to the obiter dictum in Opinion 1/91, the 
ECJ will be bound by the decisions of the ECtHR.
34) Molthagen (n 25) p. 126.
35) OJ 2007, C 302/33.
36) Art. I-9 of the failed European Constitution contained an identically worded provision.
37) Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; this opinion had been requested 
following a long academic and political discussion; see e.g. Brid Moriarty‚ “EC Accession to the 
ECHR”, Hibernian Law Journal (2001) 13, 15.
38) Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, CETS No 194; that Protocol has so far been ratifi ed 
by all members of the Council of Europe save Russia. 
 Lock /
388 Th e Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 375–398
A. Th e Exclusive Jurisdiction of the ECJ after an Accession
1. The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the ECJ
In order to accede to the ECHR, the EU39 will conclude an agreement of 
accession according to the procedure laid down in Article 218(8) of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. According to Arti cle 216 
(2) of that Treaty (the present Article 300(7) EC Treaty), the agreements 
concluded by the EU are binding on the EU and its Member States. Since 
its decision in the Haegeman case the ECJ has consistently held that the 
provisions of an agreement concluded by the Community form an integral 
part of Community law.40 An agreement of the Community can be regarded 
as an act of one of the institutions of the Community within the meaning 
of Article 234(1)(b) EC Treaty, so that the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret 
it without there being a piece of Community legislation implementing the 
agreement in Community law.
In Haegeman, which dealt with the provisions of a mixed agreement, the 
ECJ did not yet draw a distinction between agreements concluded by the 
Community alone and mixed agreements. Th at distinction was made by 
the Court in Demirel, where the ECJ distinguished between those provi-
sions of a mixed agreement that fell into the jurisdiction of the Commu-
nity and those that fell into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member 
States.41 Only in the latter case does the ECJ not have jurisdiction.42 Th is 
case law has since been confi rmed.43
39) For the purpose of this Section, I will refer to the ‘EU’ as a future party considering that the 
‘Community’ as a separate organization will cease to exist with the Treaty of Lisbon. For the 
readers’ convenience I will refer to the provisions of the EC Treaty as they presently stand.
40) Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, para. 5.
41) Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719 para. 9; a detailed analysis 
of the ECJ’s case law can be found in: Koutrakos (n 2) pp. 192–205. 
42) Panos Koutrakos, “Th e Interpretation of Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure” (2002) 7 European Foreign Aff airs Review, 25, 30–34; Opinion of AG Tesauro, Case 
53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice [1998] ECR I-3606 para. 18; this interpre-
tation of Demirel is criticized by Alan Dashwood, “Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of 
Mixed Agreements” in D. O`Keeff e and A. Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in European Law, Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hedley (Kluwer, Th e Hague. 2000) pp. 167, 170.
43) Case C-13/00 Commission/Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943 para. 14; Case C-239/03 Commis-
sion/France [2004] ECR I-9325 para. 25; Case C-459/03 Commission/Ireland [2006] ECR I-
4635, para. 84; cf. Erich Vranes, “Gemischte Abkommen und die Zuständigkeit des EuGH – 
Grundfragen und neuere Entwicklungen in den Außenbeziehungen” [2009] EuR p. 44 at p. 59.
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It follows from Articles 220 and 292 EC Treaty that the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ to interpret such agreements is exclusive. Article 292 EC Treaty 
reads:
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settle-
ment other than those provided for therein.44
Th e object and purpose of that provision is to ensure that Community law 
is interpreted in a consistent manner, which can most effi  ciently be attained 
by making the Community courts the only courts deciding issues of Com-
munity law. Th e reference to ‘this Treaty’ in Article 292 EC Treaty not only 
refers to the EC Treaty as such, but also to secondary legislation.45 Th e 
exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ was the reason why the ECJ in Opinion 
1/91 held the draft agreement on the European Economic Area to be 
incompatible with the EC Treaty.46 Th at agreement provided for the estab-
lishment of an EEA Court, which was to decide about disputes between 
the ‘contracting parties of the agreement’, i.e. the EC, its Member States 
and the EFTA States. Depending on the case in question, a ‘contracting 
party’ could either mean the EC, a Member State or the EC and its Mem-
ber States together depending on the distribution of competences under 
Community law. In case of a dispute, the EEA Court would have been 
forced to decide which party was internally competent under Community 
law, in order to decide who was to be regarded as the ‘contracting party’ for 
the dispute.47 Th e ECJ regarded that power conferred to the EEA Court to 
be incompatible with Community law as that power was exclusively vested 
in the ECJ according to Article 220 EC Treaty, a fi nding which was con-
fi rmed by Article 292 EC Treaty.48 Opinion 1/91 shows that the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret Community law not only fl ows from 
44) Art. 193 of the Euratom Treaty is worded in a similar manner.
45) Jonkheer H.F. van Panhuys, “Confl icts Between the Law of the European Communities and 
Other Rules of International Law”, 3 Common Market Law Review (1965–1966) 420, 443; 
Bernhard Wegener, “Art. 292” in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruff ert (eds.), EUV/EGV (3rd 
edn. C.H. Beck, München 2007); Christoph Herrmann, “Art. 292” in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/
EGV (C.H. Beck, München 2003). 
46) Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
47) Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 para. 34.
48) Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 para. 35.
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the express provision of Article 292 EC Treaty, but is inherent in the Com-
munity legal system.
However, the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret Community 
law does not end here. It also extends to the interpretation of agreements 
concluded by the Community. In the Mox Plant case, for instance, a mixed 
agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) was at issue. Here the Commission alleged that Ireland had 
breached the EC Treaty by submitting a dispute with the United Kingdom 
to the dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS.49 UNCLOS had 
been concluded by the Community as a mixed agreement. Th e ECJ held 
that Ireland had in fact breached its obligations under the EC Treaty 
by submitting a dispute regarding provisions of the UNCLOS to a forum 
other than the ECJ, as the Community had exercised its competence 
regarding the provisions in question.50 Th erefore, these provisions had to 
be regarded as an integral part of Community law for the interpretation of 
which the ECJ had exclusive jurisdiction.
Regarding the ECHR, the question is whether the ECJ will also claim 
to be (solely) competent to interpret its provisions as far as Community 
law is concerned. Th e ECHR will be acceded to by the EU alone because 
the Member States are already parties to it. Nonetheless, it will have to be 
qualifi ed as a mixed agreement, as both the EU and the Member States will 
be parties to it. According to the ECJ’s Haegeman case law, the ECHR will 
thus become an integral part of EU law and the ECJ will have exclusive 
jurisdiction to interpret it. Th e question of course is whether that will gen-
erally be the case or only in certain circumstances. Th e diff erence to a 
49) Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635.
50) Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 83–139; for detailed analy-
ses of that judgment see: Nikolaos Lavranos, “Th e MOX Plant Judgment of the ECJ: How 
Exclusive is the Jurisdiction of the ECJ?”, European Environmental Law Review (2006) 291; 
Nikolaos Lavranos, “Th e MOX Plant and Ijzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme 
Arbiter?” 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) 223; Nikolaos Lavranos, “Protecting its 
Exclusive Jurisdiction: Th e Mox Plant-Judgment of the ECJ”, 5 Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals (2006) 479; Nikolaos Lavranos, “Th e scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice”, 32 E.L.Rev. (2007) 83; Cesare P. Romano, 101 American Journal of Inter-
national Law (2007) 171; Bernhard Wegener, “Familienstreitigkeiten nicht nach außen tragen?!”, 
Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht [2006] 582; Karen Kaiser, “Ausschließliche Zuständigkeit des EuGH 
bei Auslegung und Anwendung von zum Gemeinschaftsrecht gehörenden Bestimmungen”, 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [2006] 464; Raphael Oen, “Streitschlichtung zwischen 
EG-Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen gemischter Verträge”, 45 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2007) 136.
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‘normal’ mixed agreement will be that the reason for a membership of both 
the EU and its Member States diff ers from the normal situation, where 
neither could alone be a member of the whole agreement due to a division 
of competences between the EU and its Member States. Th at would not be 
the case here as the EU does not have the competence regarding certain 
human rights while the Member States are competent regarding certain 
other human rights. Th erefore the decisive factor for the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
regarding the ECHR cannot be whether the relevant provision of the 
ECHR falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States. It is rather 
suggested that only if EU law was applicable in the case at question, the 
ECJ will have jurisdiction to interpret it. Th is means that the ECJ will not 
be able to claim jurisdiction in cases concerning wholly internal situations 
such as criminal law.51
2. The Conflict with the ECtHR’s Exclusive Jurisdiction
Th e ECJ’s jurisprudence on its own exclusive jurisdiction to interpret 
agreements concluded by the EU, might, however, clash with the ECtHR’s 
exclusive jurisdiction in inter-state disputes according to Article 55 ECHR. 
Article 55 ECHR reads:
Th e High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, 
they will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations 
in force between them for the purpose of submitting, by way of peti-
tion, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this 
Convention to a means of settlement other than those provided for in 
this Convention.
Th is provision leads to an exclusive jurisdiction of the ECtHR over dis-
putes between the parties to the Convention under Article 33 ECHR. 
After the EU has acceded to the ECHR, cases between its Member States 
or between the EU and a Member State could potentially be adjudicated 
by the ECJ (Articles 226 and 227 EC Treaty) and the ECtHR. Consider-
ing that both courts would regard their jurisdiction as exclusive, one must 
51) In contrast to this, A.G. Toth, “Th e European Union and Human Rights: Th e Way Forward”, 
34 Common Market Law Review (1997) 491, 509, argues that the ECJ would have jurisdiction 
over any provision of the ECHR irrespective of whether the matter falls within the competence 
of the EC or the Member States.
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ask which court would be competent to adjudicate such cases. A confl ict of 
jurisdiction could thus arise.
In contrast to that of the ECJ, the exclusive competence of the ECtHR 
is not an absolute one as it allows for special agreements between the par-
ties to the Convention regarding their disputes. One possibility to solve 
this jurisdictional confl ict would be to regard Articles 220 and 292 EC as 
a ‘special agreement’ between the Member States and the EU. Th e ques-
tion is, however, whether it is possible to regard these articles as such an 
agreement. Firstly, it could be argued that Article 55 ECHR requires that 
the special agreement be concluded between all the parties to the Conven-
tion. And secondly, one could contend that Article 55 ECHR demands 
that the special agreement must specifi cally refer to the ECHR. Neither 
condition would be fulfi lled by Articles 220 and 292 EC as the EC Treaty 
is an agreement only between some of the parties to the Convention and it 
is phrased in a general manner.
a. Agreement Only between the EU and its Member States
Addressing the fi rst issue whether an agreement only between the EU and 
its Member States is suffi  cient to satisfy Article 55 ECHR, one fi rst has to 
concede that the wording of Article 55 ECHR is not clear in this respect.52 
Th e ECommHR argued that it was enough to satisfy the requirements of 
ex Article 62 ECHR, which was phrased in exactly the same manner as 
Article 55 ECHR, if both parties to the dispute have agreed upon another 
procedure than that before the ECommHR.53 Th e ECommHR’s interpre-
tation in this decision is supported by the travaux préparatoires. Th e Swed-
ish proposal regarding that article expressly stated that ‘the parties concerned’ 
could decide to submit the dispute in question to another forum.54 Th at 
52) Some commentators contend that the agreement has to be concluded between all the parties 
to the ECHR: Joachim A. Frowein and Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar Art. 62 (2nd 
edn., N.P. Engel Verlag, Kehl, 1996); Wilhelm H. Wilting, Vertragskonkurrenz im Völkerrecht 
(Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 1996) p. 223.
53) Cyprus v Turkey (App No 25781/94) ECommHR 28 June 1996.
54) Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Volume 5 (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, Th e Hague, 1979) p. 58; the proposal was 
phrased: “Th e Commission and the European Court having been created to settle disputes relat-
ing to the interpretation and the application of this Convention, such disputes shall not be 
submitted to other judicial or arbitral tribunals established by treaties or declarations in force 
unless the Parties concerned shall so decide by an agreement expressly relating to the dispute in 
question”.
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proposal was not rejected during the drafting process of the ECHR. Only 
the wording was slightly changed so that one can infer that the drafters did 
not want to substantially change the Swedish proposal. Such an interpreta-
tion is supported by the nature of the ECHR compared to that of the EU. 
Th e latter is an autonomous legal order, which avails itself of a Court of 
Justice with an exclusive jurisdiction, in order to ensure a coherent inter-
pretation of EU law. In contrast to that, the ECHR cannot be regarded as 
an autonomous legal order, as it aims at protecting universal human rights. 
Th erefore the exclusive jurisdiction given to the ECtHR by Article 55 
ECHR does not seem to serve the purpose of protecting the ECHR from 
being interpreted by another forum as was argued by Shany.55 Rather it was 
the aim of Article 55 ECHR to prevent parties to the Convention from 
being subjected to international adjudication against their will. Th is can 
only be understood before the background of the original version of the 
ECHR. Th e original legal situation was comparable to that before the ICJ, 
in that the parties had to agree to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.56 Th ere-
fore, Article 55 ECHR was mainly designed to prevent that a party to the 
Convention would be forced to respond to a dispute concerning the ECHR 
before another court, if that other court could claim jurisdiction over dis-
putes between the parties. Th us, there is neither any evidence from the 
drafting process, nor from the object and purpose of Article 55 ECHR, 
that the special agreement under Article 55 ECHR would have to be con-
cluded between all the parties to the ECHR. It follows that a special agree-
ment between some of the parties to the ECHR suffi  ces.
b. Specific Reference to ECHR in the Special Agreement
Th e second question is whether a ‘special agreement’ pursuant to Article 55 
ECHR has to refer specifi cally to the ECHR or whether it is suffi  cient if 
that agreement simply confers jurisdiction over a certain type of dispute 
over Convention rights, e.g. where both parties to a dispute before the ICJ 
generally accepted its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36(2) of the 
ICJ Statute. Only if that were the case, would Articles 220, 292 EC Treaty 
qualify as such a special agreement. Th e intention of the drafters of the 
ECHR was to avoid that parties to the Convention would be subjected to 
court proceedings on the basis of general jurisdiction clauses. Article 55 
55) Shany (n 1), 191.
56) Ex Art. 48 ECHR.
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ECHR (ex Article 62) was especially aimed at declarations according to 
Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, with which a State can declare that it gen-
erally accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ. In such a case, Article 55 ECHR 
was supposed to prevent such a dispute, by prescribing the exclusive juris-
diction of the ECtHR. Th erefore the drafting history suggests that a gen-
eral clause such as Articles 220, 292 EC would not be suffi  cient.
However, it seems that the original idea behind Article 55 ECHR is no 
longer applicable as the jurisdiction of the ECtHR has become obligatory 
after Protocol 11 entered into force on 1 November 1998. Th erefore, par-
ties to the Convention no longer need to be protected from being sub-
jected to court proceedings alleging an infringement of the ECHR as they 
now must answer these cases in any event. Nonetheless, Article 55 (ex 
Article 62) ECHR remained part of the Convention. Th erefore one may 
wonder which function that provision now has, as the parties to the Con-
vention can no longer escape their responsibilities thereunder. It is unlikely 
that the drafters of Protocol 11 merely overlooked Article 55 and forgot to 
remove it from the Convention, because they changed its numbering. Th us 
one can conclude that Article 55 ECHR has a function that diff ers from 
that of ex Article 62 ECHR. Being an exclusive jurisdiction clause, the 
function of Article 55 ECHR can now only be generally to exclude other 
courts and tribunals from deciding cases based on the ECHR, in order to 
ensure its consistent interpretation by the ECtHR. Considering that the 
ECtHR is the only court deciding on (the far more frequent) applications 
by individuals according to Article 34 ECHR, it makes sense to confer a 
similar exclusivity to the ECtHR regarding inter-state cases. Th e question 
then is why does Article 55 ECHR still provide for a possibility to present 
the dispute to another forum. Th at can be explained by the fact that the 
ECHR, in contrast to the EU, is not an autonomous and self-contained 
legal order.57 Th erefore, the parties should be given the opportunity to have 
the dispute decided by another forum if they expressly wish to do so. Th us, 
Article 55 ECHR creates a default rule that the ECtHR is competent to 
adjudicate inter-state disputes. Bearing in mind that exceptions to the rule 
must be construed narrowly, an agreement transferring jurisdiction to 
another forum will have to relate specifi cally to the ECHR. Th erefore, the 
general exclusive competence of the ECJ according to Articles 220 and 
57) Th e ECJ recently confi rmed that autonomy in its Kadi judgment, cf. Joined Cases 402/05 P and 
415/05 P Kadi and al Barakaat v Council, Judgment of 3 September 2008, [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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292 EC Treaty does not satisfy the requirements of Article 55 ECHR. Th us 
both the ECJ and ECHR will be competent to adjudicate such inter-state 
disputes. Th erefore, a confl ict of jurisdictions arises.
In order to solve that confl ict, the EU and its Member States would have 
to conclude a special agreement explicitly referring to the ECHR stating 
that the Convention will be interpreted by the ECJ in cases between the 
Member States or between a Member State and the EU.58 Such an agree-
ment will preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ and will at the 
same time be in accordance with the requirements of the ECHR.
B. Th e New Relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR
1. The Future of the Bosphorus Presumption
As already mentioned, the present relationship between the ECJ and the 
ECtHR is characterized by a mutual exercise of comity in that both courts 
respect the work of the other. In Bosphorus, the ECtHR showed a great 
degree of deference towards the ECJ, in that it is presumed that the human 
rights protection under Community law is equivalent to that required by 
the ECHR. However, it is doubtful whether that presumption will still be 
justifi able after an accession. An accession of the EU to the ECHR will 
provide a solid legal basis for a review of alleged human rights violations 
committed by the organs of the EU. Th at review will also include decisions 
of the ECJ. As previously mentioned, the Bosphorus presumption should 
be applied in cases where only the Community acted. It would hardly 
be justifi able if that presumption were to be retained in such cases, because 
it would deprive the ECtHR of a great deal of cases arising within the 
EU. It would moreover lead to an unequal treatment of the diff erent 
parties to the ECHR, in that the presumption would privilege the EU.59 
58) Others have argued that it would become necessary to make a reservation (Art. 57 ECHR) or 
even to completely exclude the possibility of an inter-state dispute for all Member States and the 
EU: European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin of 
the European Commission, Supplement 2/79, para. 27; pleadings by the Spanish government 
regarding Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; Molthagen (n 25) p. 195; 
Gerhard Baumgartner, “EMKR und Gemeinschaftsrecht”, Zeitschrift für Verwaltung [1996], 
319, 330; Steering Committee on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2, para. 63.
59) Even regarding the present relationship between the two courts an alleged double-standard 
has been criticized, cf. the joint concurring opinion by Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucha-
rova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki in the Bosphorus case, para. 4; Eckes (n 17), 65.
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Considering that the ECtHR does not grant such a privilege to any of the 
highest national courts of the parties to the ECHR, such a privilege for the 
ECJ is hardly justifi able.60 Th is argument is reinforced by the fact that such 
a privilege is even denied to those national courts that provide for a more 
eff ective protection of human rights than the ECJ, e.g. by granting easier 
access. In addition, after an accession to the ECHR, the need for the 
ECtHR to exercise comity will have ended. Th e justifi cation for the exer-
cise of comity was that the relationship between the two European courts 
is presently not fully clear. After an accession that will no longer be the 
case. Th erefore, it is to be expected that the ECtHR will give up its Bospho-
rus jurisprudence after an accession.61
2. Binding Effect of ECtHR Decisions on the ECJ According to Opinion 1/91?
A further question is whether an accession by the EU to the ECHR could 
lead the ECJ to apply its famous dictum in Opinion 1/91 for the fi rst time, 
thus making the ECtHR’s case law binding for the ECJ. It reads:
Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own sys-
tem of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes 
between the Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to 
interpret its provisions, the decisions of that court will be binding on 
the Community institutions, including the Court of Justice. Th ose 
decisions will also be binding in the event that the Court of Justice is 
called upon to rule, by way of preliminary ruling or in a direct action, 
on the interpretation of the international agreement, in so far as that 
agreement is an integral part of the Community legal order.62
60) After an accession, the proceedings before the ECJ will no longer be regarded as “another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement” according to Art. 35 ECHR as the ECJ 
will have to be treated like any highest court of a party to the Convention: Steering Committee 
for Human Rights CDDH (2002)010 Addendum 2, para. 48–49; Leo Zwaak in P. Van Dijk 
et al. (eds.), Th eory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn., Intersen-
tia, Antwerp 2006), 183.
61) Laurent Scheeck, “Th e Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through 
Human Rights”, 65 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öff entliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2005), 837, 
862; Douglas-Scott (n 10), 243, 252; Andreas Haratsch, “Die Solange-Rechtsprechung des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte”, 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öff entliches Recht 
und Völkerrecht (2006) 927, 945.
62) Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 para. 39.
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As the ECHR constitutes an international agreement with its own court, 
the dictum seems to be applicable. Th e rationale behind the binding eff ect 
of these decisions on the organs of the Community, which includes the 
ECJ, is that the EU as a party to an agreement, is bound by that agree-
ment. If that agreement provides that the parties to it are bound by the 
decisions of the Court established to interpret the agreement, the EU, and 
therefore its organs (including the ECJ), are bound by these decisions. It is, 
however, not clear from the above quote how far that binding eff ect of 
decisions goes. It is rather unlikely that the ECJ intended to introduce a 
doctrine of stare decisis through the back door as such a doctrine does not 
exist anywhere in Community or international law. Moreover, under inter-
national law only the decisions rendered in proceedings to which the EU 
was a party are binding on it. Considering the rationale behind the dictum 
in Opinion 1/91 is to be found in international law, the ECJ is only bound 
by an interpretation of an international agreement rendered in cases where 
the EU was a party to the proceedings. Regarding the ECHR, this is evi-
denced by Article 46 ECHR, which shows that the decisions of the ECtHR 
are only binding inter partes. Th erefore, the ECJ is only bound by those 
decisions to which the EU was a party. It follows that where the ECtHR 
fi nds that the EU has violated the rights guaranteed in the ECHR, the ECJ 
will be bound by that decision when interpreting provisions of the ECHR 
in a subsequent case dealing with the same issue. Such a situation might, 
for example, arise where the applicant has suff ered a damage due to the 
EU’s human rights violation and then sues the EU according to the present 
Article 288(2) EC Treaty.63 Th e ECJ will in such a case be required to 
decide whether there has been a violation of the ECHR. Where the appli-
cant has already obtained a judgment by the ECtHR fi nding an infringe-
ment of the ECHR regarding the same matter, the ECJ is bound to follow 
that judgment.
63) Regarding the decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the ECJ has been unwilling 
to recognize them as binding, mainly due to the peculiarities of WTO law: Case C-377/02 Van 
Parys v BIRB [2005] ECR I-1465; Confi rmed in: Case 351/04 Ikea Wholesale Ltd. v Commis-
sioner of Customs & Excise [2007] ECR I-7723.
 Lock /
398 Th e Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 375–398
V. Conclusion
Th e relationship between the two European courts is likely to undergo 
signifi cant changes in the future. Presently, the ECtHR puts the ECJ in a 
privileged position as the ECtHR will generally presume that the ECHR 
was not violated in cases where there was a possibility of judicial review by 
the ECJ and where the Member State held responsible for an alleged viola-
tion of the ECHR did not have discretion in implementing Community 
law. Th is approach is justifi ed by the fact that the ECJ usually follows the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR and thereby helps to maintain a 
relatively high human standard in the European Community. Th is situa-
tion will not signifi cantly change once the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has entered into force. Th e ECHR will remain the minimum human 
rights standard in the EU. Th e ECJ will be bound to interpret the ECHR 
but will not be bound to follow the ECtHR’s case law. It can, however, be 
expected that the cooperation between the two European courts will increase 
somewhat further. After the EU’s accession to the ECHR, the present 
coexistence of the two European courts will change. Th e ECJ’s decisions 
will become directly reviewable by the ECtHR. In addition, the reason for 
the Bosphorus jurisprudence, which puts the ECJ in a privileged position 
relative to national courts, will disappear and that jurisprudence will prob-
ably be given up. Moreover, the ECJ will be bound to follow the ECtHR’s 
decisions, where the EU was a party to previous proceedings in the same 
matter.

